

## William S. Robinson: List of Publications

Last updated 3/1/24

### 1. Books

*Epiphenomenal Mind: An Integrated Account of Sensations, Beliefs, and Pleasure* (New York and London: Routledge, 2019).

*Your Brain and You* (New York: Goshawk Books, 2010). (For non-professional audience. Link to description is [here](#).)

*Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

*Computers, Minds, and Robots* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).

*Brains and People* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988).

### 2. Papers

Papers behind paywalls can generally be obtained by request to wsrob at iastate dot edu.

Panexperientialism and Radical Emergence. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 31(1-2):149-172 (2024).

Dis-Illusioning Experiences. *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 14:1219-1236 (2023). DOI.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00630-4.

Dispensing With Experiential Acquaintance. *Inquiry*, published online on August 29, 2022. DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2022.2116478. Accessible at [https://drive.google.com/file/d/16bl\\_eqMYxpQg85550fHTWyci5YFn1zYg/view?usp=drive\\_link](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16bl_eqMYxpQg85550fHTWyci5YFn1zYg/view?usp=drive_link).

Thick NCCs Yield Physicalist Epiphenomenalism. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 27(7-8):77-94 (2020).

Dualism. In R. J. Gennaro, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness* (London and New York: Routledge, 2018).

Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 99:100-117 (2018). (Published online 11/26/2015. DOI : 10.1111/papq.12138.)

Concept Acquisition and Experiential Change: An Examination of Siegel's Hologram Argument, *The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication* 9:1-11 (2014). DOI:

10.4148/biyclc.v9i0.1089. (This paper can be accessed through the website of the publisher, New Prairie Press.)

Red is the Hardest Problem, *Topoi*, 36(1):5-16 (2017). (Published online as of 8/29/2014. DOI is 10.1007/s11245-014-9267-2) Accessible at <https://rdcu.be/7y0s> .

Hidden Nature Physicalism. *The Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, 7(1):71-89 (2016). (Published online 3/1/2015. DOI: 10.1007/s13164-015-0238-3).

Philosophical Challenges. In K. Frankish & W. M. Ramsey, eds., *The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 64-85.

Developing Dualism and Approaching the Hard Problem. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 21(1-2):156-182 (2014).

Phenomenal Realist Physicalism Implies Coherency of Epiphenomenalist Meaning. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 19(3-4):145-163 (2012).

A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology. In T. Bayne and M. Montague, eds., *Cognitive Phenomenology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 197-214.

Article, "Epiphenomenalism". In *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science*, vol. 1, July/August 2010: 539-547. (This article is wholly distinct from my two other encyclopedia articles with the same title.)

Experience and Representation. In Wright, E., ed., *The Case for Qualia* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford, 2008), pp. 73-87.

Evolution and Epiphenomenalism. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 14(11):27-42 (2007).

Papineau's Conceptual Dualism and the Distinctness Intuition. *Synthesis Philosophica* (2007) 22:319-333.

Qualitativer Ereignisrealismus und Epiphänomenalismus. In T. Metzinger, ed., *Grundkurs Philosophie des Geistes, Band 2: Das Leib-Seele-Problem* (Paderborn: Mentis Verlag, 2007), pp. 325-363.

What Is It Like to Like? *Philosophical Psychology*, (2006) 19:743-765.

Knowing Epiphenomena. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, (2006) 13:85-100.

Thoughts Without Distinctive, Non-Imagistic Phenomenology. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, (2005) 70:534-561.

A Few Thoughts Too Many? In Gennaro, R., ed., *Higher Order Theories of Consciousness* (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2004), pp. 295-313.

Colors, Arousal, Functionalism and Individual Differences”, *Psyche* 10 (2), September 2004.

Article, “Epiphenomenalism”. In Nadel, L., ed., *Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science* (London: Nature Publishing Group, 2003), vol. 2., pp. 8-14. (This article is wholly distinct from my two other encyclopedia entries with the same title.)

Jackson’s Apostasy. *Philosophical Studies* (2002) 111:277-293.

Representation and Cognitive Explanation. In A. Riegler, M. Peschl and A. von Stein, eds., *Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences: Does Representation Need Reality?* (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 1999), pp. 83-91. (Expanded version of article of same title in the Austrian Cognitive Science Society Technical Report 97-01 (1997), 70-75 .)

Article, "Epiphenomenalism". In E. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, archive edition of March 31, 1999. Updated 2003; 2007;2011; 2015; 2019; 2023. Available at <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism>>.

Evolution and Self-Evidence. In P. van Loocke, ed., *The Nature of Concepts* (Routledge, 1999), pp. 168-183. (Expanded version of article with same title in *Philosophica* 57:35-51 (1996). As of 2/21/23 this article is available without paywall on the website of *Philosophica*.)

Qualia Realism and Neural Activation Patterns. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* (1999) 6:65-80.

Intrinsic Qualities of Experience: Surviving Harman's Critique. *Erkenntnis* (1998) 47:285-309.

Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense. *Biology and Philosophy* (1997) 12:51-71.

The Hardness of the Hard Problem. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* (1996) 3:14-25. [Reprinted in J. Shear, ed., *Explaining Consciousness -- The 'Hard Problem'* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995-7).]

Direct Representation. *Philosophical Studies* (1995) 80:305-322.

Mild Realism, Causation, and Folk Psychology. *Philosophical Psychology* (1995) 8:167-187.

Brain Symbols and Computationalist Explanation. *Minds and Machines* (1995) 5:25-44.

Orwell, Stalin and Determinate Qualia. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* (1994) 75:151-164.

Penrose and Mathematical Ability. *Analysis* (1992) 52:80-87.

Rationalism, Expertise And the Dreyfuses' Critique of AI Research. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* (1991) 29:271-290.

States and Beliefs. *Mind* (1990) 99:33-51.

Ascription, Intentionality and Understanding. *The Monist* (1986) 69:584-97.

Toward Eliminating Churchland's Eliminationism. *Philosophical Topics* (1985) 13:61-68.

The Ontological Argument. *The International Journal for Philosophy and Religion* (1984) 16:51-59.

Dretske's Etiological View. *Southwest Philosophical Studies* (1983) 9:23-29.

Causation, Sensations and Knowledge. *Mind* (1982) 91:524-40.

Sellarsian Materialism. *Philosophy of Science* (1982) 49:212-27.

Dennett's Dilemma. (Co-authored with A. David Kline.) *The Journal of Critical Analysis* (1979) 8:1-4.

Do Pains Make a Difference to Our Behavior? *American Philosophical Quarterly* (1979) 16:327-34.

Technology and Values: Some Preliminary Clarifications. *Iowa State Journal of Research* (1979) 54:241-47.

Chisholm's Paralogism. *Philosophical Studies* (1979) 36:309-16.

The Legend of the Given. In H.-N. Castañeda, ed., *Action, Knowledge and Reality: Critical Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975, 83-108).

Dennett's Analysis of Awareness. *Philosophical Studies* (1972) 23:147-52.

Judgments Involving Identification. *Analysis* (1964) 24:206-08.

### 3. Commentaries and other brief publications

James's Evolutionary Argument. *Disputatio* VI(39):229-237 (2014). This paper is a commentary on Joseph Corabi, The Misuse and Failure of the Evolutionary Argument, *Disputatio* VI(39):199-227 (2014).

Experiencing is Not Observing: A Response to Dwayne Moore on Epiphenomenalism and Self-Stultification. *The Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 4(2):185-192 (2013). (Online publication date: 11/28/12. DOI: 10.1007/s13164-012-0119-y.)

Web article, Challenges for a Humanoid Robot. Posted 6/22/2011. Accessed 11/28/22 by searching 'On the Human' and clicking on 'On the Human – National Humanities Center'. The right side of the Home page has a column headed 'Recent Posts', and Challenges for a Humanoid Robot is fifth item from bottom. Some comments with my replies follow the article.

A Wake Up Call: Commentary on Philip Goff's 'Property Dualists Should Be Panpsychists', Third Consciousness Online Conference, Jan-Feb 2011. Accessed 11/28/22 at <http://consciousnessonline.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/commentary-on-goff-robinson1.pdf>. Revised version is in Richard Brown, ed., *Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), pp. 93-101.

Article, "Epiphenomenalism". In T. Bayne and A. Cleermans, eds., *The Oxford Companion to Consciousness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 271-273.

Doubts About Receptivity. Commentary on G. Rosenberg, *A Place for Consciousness* (Oxford: 2004), *Psyche* 12 (2006). Accessed 11/28/22 through [journalpsyche.org](http://journalpsyche.org).

Searle and Subjectivity. *Bulletin of Advanced Reasoning and Knowledge*, 2:11-18 (2004).

Perception, Affect and Epiphenomenalism. Commentary on Mangan, B. (2001) Sensation's Ghost: The Non-sensory "Fringe" of Consciousness. *Psyche* 10 (1) (2004) Accessed 11/28/22 through [journalpsyche.org](http://journalpsyche.org).

A Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness? Commentary on Peter Carruthers' "Natural Theories of Consciousness", *Psyche* 5(4) (1999). Accessed 11/28/22 through [journalpsyche.org](http://journalpsyche.org).

Could a Robot Be Qualitatively Conscious? *AISB Quarterly*, No. 99 (Winter/Spring, 1998) 13-18.

A Gap Not Bridged. Comments on J. G. Taylor's "Cortical Activity and the Explanatory Gap", *Consciousness and Cognition* (1998) 7:210-211.

Commentary on David Boonin-Vail's "Contractarianism Gone Wild: Carruthers and the Moral Status of Animals", *Between the Species* (Winter & Spring, 1994) 49-52.

Can Animals Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense? – Yes. *Ag Bioethics Forum*, (December, 1992) 3-4. [This is a brief statement of the position I took in a debate with Peter Carruthers on the ISU campus in 1992. The Parks Library at ISU has an audiotape of this debate, under the title 'Can Animals Feel Pain?'. Special Collections Archives (Soun 003 921).]

It's Past Fixing. Discussion note on Peter Forrest's "Backward Causation in Defense of Free Will". *Mind* (1986) 95:230-32.

Remarks on Professor Hocutt's 'Spartans, Strawmen and Symptoms'. *Behaviorism* (1985) 13:157-61.

Why I am a Dualist. In *Philosophy: The Basic Issues*, E. D. Klemke, A. D. Kline & R. Hollinger, eds., New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982, 169-76 (and, with revisions, in subsequent editions).